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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to understand why venture capitalists often syndicate their in-
vestments, and how syndication affects their post-investment involvement. We consider a venture
capital investment model, in which the quality of investment projects is unknown. Depending
on their level of experience, venture capitalists are more or less efficient at screening projects.
Screening can also be improved by a second investor appraisal. Obtaining this second piece of in-
formation can be costly though, since the initial venture capitalist has to disclose the existence of
the investment project to a second investor. The latter becomes de facto a potential competitor,
reducing the initial venture capitalist's profits. In this setting, we first establish that syndication
can be a coordination device to prevent competition. We then investigate how the syndication
decision affects the screening process, and explore the cost of syndication in terms of investment
decisions or post-investment involvement of venture capitalists. We conclude with empirical pre-
dictions linking the level of experience of venture capitalists, the decision to syndicate, the level
of post-investment involvement and the characteristics of the venture capital investments.
Keywords: venture capital, syndication, screening, experience, competition.
JEL codes: G2, G3, D8.
1 Introduction
Venture capitalists often look for financial partners to complete their investments in start-up
firms. This so-called syndication can either take place at the same round of financing or be
sequential, with new partners coming in at later rounds of financing. Even taken in the most
restrictive sense, syndication is widely observed: Brander, Amit and Antweiler (2002) report
from Canadian data that 60 % of venture capital investments were syndicated in 1997. Wright
and Lockett (2003) report from VentureEconomics and EVCA data that about 30% of venture
capital investments were syndicated in Europe in 2001, compared to 60 % in the US.1 The
objective of this paper is to understand why venture capitalists syndicate and how syndication
affects the efficiency and the profitability of the venture capital industry.
At the root of these questions is the source of value-added of venture capitalists. Venture
capital investments can be successful because venture capitalists are good at selecting projects
and/or because they enhance the profitability of the projects they back by providing useful
advice. Sahlman (1988, 1990) reports that venture capitalists spend a great deal of time to
carefully select projects, and remain also deeply involved in the post-investment development of
those projects. Emphasizing the importance of the selection process, Fenn, Liang and Prowse
(1995) estimate that only 1% of the projects received by venture capitalists obtain financing.
Gorman and Sahlman (1989) find that venture capitalists have repeated interactions with the
firms they invest in. This enables them to extract information on the quality of their investment,
in order to terminate the less promising ventures (Gompers (1995)). They can also monitor and
directly control entrepreneurs (Lerner (1995), Hellmann and Puri (2002)), and provide managerial
advice.2
In line with the above empirical literature, we consider that the value added by venture
capitalists is two-fold: their expertise allows them to spot the most profitable projects and to
enhance their value by providing valuable advice. However, we do not view these two activities as
separate tasks: the efficiency of the selection process determines the effectiveness of the venture
capitalists' involvement. In our model, this interaction arises from the venture capitalist's effort
being more valuable for high quality projects. Therefore, the decision to provide advice will
depend on the perceived quality of the investment project. The important question is then: how
can venture capitalists efficiently select projects? The answer we propose in this paper is that
syndication helps to gather information on the investment opportunities, which improves the
selection process, and impacts the post-investment involvement of venture capitalists.
1Hopp and Rieder (2006) document using German data that European figures are very sensitive to the industry
considered: Biotech and Internet industries exhibit levels of syndication similar to their US counterparts.
2The importance of this advising role has been extensively documented empirically in Gorman and Sahlman
(1989), Sahlman (1990), Bygrave and Timmons (1992), Gompers and Lerner (1999), and more recently Hellmann
and Puri (2002). For theoretical treatments, see Schmidt (2003), Repullo and Suarez (1999), or Casamatta (2003).
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To study these issues, we consider a model where a venture capitalist must decide whether or
not to invest in a highly uncertain project, and whether or not to exert costly effort to improve
the project's profitability once investment is made. The venture capitalist can screen the project
by generating an informative signal on the project's true quality. An important assumption
is that the preciseness of his signal depends on his level of experience. On top of his signal,
the venture capitalist has the opportunity to ask for a second evaluation, performed by another
venture capitalist. However, obtaining this evaluation can be costly. Disclosing the existence of
an investment opportunity to another venture capitalist makes him a potential rival: he could
compete with the initial venture capitalist to obtain exclusive financing of the project. From the
point of view of the venture capitalist first informed of a new project, revealing the existence of
the project creates the conditions for profit-dissipating competition. In order to preserve part
of his monopoly rents, the venture capitalist has no choice but to negotiate with his potential
competitor, and share the project's surplus.
The main results of the model are the following. First, information can be gathered by forming
a syndicate, i.e. by signing a co-investment, co-ownership contract between the two venture
capitalists. Second, inexperienced venture capitalists do not fear potential competition because
their evaluation of the project is not accurate enough to allow them to invest alone. They form a
syndicate each time it is optimal to do so. At the opposite, very experienced venture capitalists
suffer from potential competition and are more reluctant to syndicate. Therefore they need to
choose more experienced partners or to forgo syndication. Third, syndication affects the venture
capitalist's effort decision, to improve the project expected profitability. Moderately experienced
venture capitalists do not exert enough effort, because of the cost of potential competition. At
the opposite, very experienced venture capitalists exert too much effort, because of the same cost.
The intuition of this result is the following. Potential competition prevents venture capitalists
from gathering enough information. Consequently, moderately experienced venture capitalists
who would like to, but cannot syndicate, remain too pessimistic about the project's success, and
do not exert effort. At the opposite, very experienced venture capitalists remain too optimistic
about the project's success and exert too much effort. Last, syndication can also be costly
for inexperienced venture capitalists if the effort decision is not observable. Syndication entails
leaving part of the firm's equity to the syndicate partner, which weakens the venture capitalist's
incentives to exert effort. We find that since syndication is more likely for inexperienced venture
capitalists, they are more likely to bear this additional cost of syndication.
The original contributions of the paper are first to propose a model where syndication arises
endogenously. Syndication is not the unique way to achieve coordination, though. For instance,
contractual arrangements involving transfers between venture capitalists are equally valid in our
setting. We view these transfers as less likely, since venture capital investments are typically
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governed by restrictive fund covenants.3 It is plausible that setting transfers from one fund to
another generates additional costs to circumvent the funds investment restrictions. We suggest
that syndication, because it avoids direct transfers between venture capitalists, can mitigate these
problems and allow information gathering. Second, we highlight the importance of experience on
the formation and efficiency of syndicates, and on the ex-post involvement of venture capitalists.
To our knowledge, no other theoretical paper considers this dimension.4 This enables us to
propose a number of empirical predictions and possible tests.
First, the model predicts that the level of experience should be a major determinant of
the syndication decision. In particular, standalone investments should be performed by highly
experienced venture capitalists. Two effects combine to sustain this result: first, as was already
recognized in the literature, more experienced venture capitalists generate better signals (see
Lerner (1994)). Second, syndication is more costly the higher the level of experience of venture
capitalists: because they have more accurate appraisals, experienced venture capitalists have
more to lose when disclosing a deal. This prediction is supported by the observations of Hopp
and Rieder (2006) that more experienced German venture capitalists syndicate much less than
inexperienced ones. Also, a natural consequence of this result is that more syndication should
arise in countries where the venture capital industry is young and rather inexperienced.5 A
second prediction of the model is that the uncertainty of the portfolio firm, or of the industry
in which venture capitalists invest, should also call for more syndication. This is consistent with
the analyses of Bygrave (1987), and Chiplin and Wright (1997), who document that syndication
is positively related to the level of uncertainty, and of Brander et al. (2002) who measure
that standalone investments have less variability than syndicated ones. Another implication of
this result is that more drastic innovations should induce more syndication: Hopp and Rieder
(2006) do find that syndication is less frequent for more mature industries. Whether this result
holds at the firm level is still an empirical issue. To test more precisely the predictions of our
model, one could identify the product-market strategies of the portfolio firms, and define different
degrees of innovativeness, in the spirit of Hellmann and Puri (2000). Third, our model relates
the syndication decision to the involvement of venture capitalists. The predictions are two-fold:
first, because inexperienced venture capitalists syndicate more, and because the expected returns
are not very high, they do not exert enough effort. Second, experienced venture capitalists who
invest alone provide more, but sometimes too much, effort. This last point is supported by
Sapienza, Manigart and Vermeir (1996) who find a positive relationship between experience
and involvement. It is also in line with Kaplan and Strömberg (2004) who find a positive
3See Gompers and Lerner (1996) for an analysis of such covenants.
4A recent paper by Cestone, Lerner and White (2006) considers the impact of experience in the formation of
venture capital syndicates, but does not relate this to the ex-post involvement of venture capitalists.
5This prediction may seem at odd with the observation that syndication is very frequent in the US. Note
however that the level of innovation of projects also impacts the level of syndication. The fact that venture
capital in the US is notoriously directed towards innovative ventures could explain the high level of syndication.
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relationship between value-added activities and the equity stake of venture capitalists, and a
negative relationship between the size of syndicates and value-added activities. Last, our results
also address the issue of the relative profitability of standalone and syndicated investments. The
empirical evidence is mixed: Brander et al. (2002) find that syndicated investments exhibit
higher returns and higher volatility that stand-alone investments. Using different performance
measures, Hege, Palomino and Schwienbacher (2006) find no significant relationship between
the size of the syndicate and the level of excess returns. In our model, the relation between
syndication and returns depends on the level of experience of venture capitalists: the important
point is that, in contrast to alternative learning models, syndicated investments can exhibit higher
expected returns than standalone investments. A possible test would be to include the level of
experience of syndicate members, when testing the relation between returns and syndication.
In our model, syndication does not result from financial constraints or diversification mo-
tives but from the need to gather information while preventing competition. It is important to
discuss to what extent our predictions are different, and are able to explain different empirical
observations, from these competing rationales for syndication. An implication of the resource
constraint motive is that syndication increases with the size of deals, and decreases with the size
of venture capital funds. An implication of our model is that syndication increases with the level
of uncertainty, but is not affected by deal size, or venture capital fund size. This could lead to op-
posite predictions if one considers that early-stage investments are typically more uncertain, but
require less financial investments than late-stage rounds. Our model predicts more syndication
for early-stage rounds, while the resource constraint motive suggests more syndication at later
stages. There is not but limited evidence on this. If any, anecdotal evidence on UK investments
suggests that the size of syndicates is smaller at later stages, while amounts invested are larger
(Wright and Lockett (2003)). Another reason usually put forward to explain syndication is risk
diversification. It is not easy to derive predictions from the risk mitigation motive though. From
a theoretical point of view, it is not clear why VCs should care about diversification at the fund
level, and why syndication should be the tool to mitigate risk.6 Some empirical evidence by Hopp
and Rieder (2006) find that the concentration of VC portfolios increases with syndication. If any,
this suggests that syndication is not used to hold a diversified portfolio of firms in different lines
of business. While we believe that the risk mitigation and resource constraints definitely bear
some relevance, it seems unlikely that they are the only determinant of the decision to syndicate.
Our paper is closely related to a few papers that explicitly focus on the syndication decision
of financial intermediaries. Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) is probably the first paper where
syndication emerges as the optimal arrangement. However they focus on sequential syndication,
6The limited partners who invest in venture capital funds are institutional investors who only invest a small
portion of their endowments in the venture capital sector, and who can invest in several VC funds. In addition,
if the VC firms themselves want to mitigate risk, they can achieve this through the management of several funds.
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whereby an initial venture capitalist remains in the firm to solve a lemon problem with future
investors, while we focus on the formation of simultaneous syndicates. Pichler and Wilhelm
(2001) provide a theory of syndicates in the investment banking industry. Their approach differs
in the sense that they view syndication as a way to solve a moral hazard in team problem (see
also Bubna (2002)), while we view syndication as a way to prevent competition. More recently,
Bachman and Schindele (2006) and Cestone, Lerner and White (2006) both analyze models to
explain the formation of syndicates: in Bachman and Schindele (2006), syndication can be a way
to deter theft of idea by increasing the reputation loss of each syndicate member. Cestone, Lerner
and White (2006) also analyze the syndication decision of a venture capitalist, and study how an
optimally designed contractual arrangement of syndicates, can induce information revelation of
the syndicate members. In their model, the cost of syndication raises from the adverse selection
costs to induce truthfull information revelation, while in our model it raises from the disclosure
of a profitable deal to a potential competitor. Their results share our view that the cost of
syndication increases with the level of experience of venture capitalists, but they differ in the
sense that, in their model, the initial venture capitalist does not always gain by choosing the
most experienced partner. Another difference is that we explicitly consider the link between
the screening process and the value-added efforts of venture capitalists, while the value-added
dimension is absent in Cestone, Lerner, and White (2006).
This paper belongs naturally to the broader literature on venture capital. An important
difference is that while most of the research activity has focused on the post-investment role
of venture capitalists,7 and studied the financial contracts between venture capitalists and in-
vestors,8 we emphasize the pre-investment selection process of venture capitalists and focus on
their syndication decision. This pre-investment selection process has not been much analyzed
in the venture capital context. Kaplan and Strömberg (2004) study empirically the contents of
venture capitalists' investment analysis, and their relation to the type of contracts and ex-post
involvement of venture capitalists. Garmaise (2006) considers a model where venture capitalists
have superior expertise in project evaluation compared to other agents. He however concentrates
on the financial contract between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist, while we focus on
the contractual arrangement between venture capitalists, and study the formation of syndicates.
Brander et al. (2002) also investigate the selection and value-added activities of venture capital-
ists, but they do not endogenize the syndication decision. Last, our paper is also related to Biais
and Perotti (2003) who study the formation of a partnership by experts with different pieces of
information. They share our assumption that revealing the existence of an investment project to
7See Admati and Pfleiderer (1994), Bergemann and Hege (1998), Cornelli and Yosha (2003), and Dessì (2005)
for a theoretical analysis of sequential investment and the optimal continuation decision, Schmidt (2003), Renucci
(2001), Repullo and Suarez (1999), or Casamatta (2003) on the advising role of venture capitalists, and Chan,
Siegel and Thakor (1990), Hellmann (1998) or Cestone (2002) on the control exerted by venture capitalists.
8See Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) for a detailed empirical analysis of venture capital contracts.
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another expert can be costly. In a context of private information, they highlight the importance
of the complementarity between the evaluations of the different experts to mitigate the risk of
idea-stealing. In our model, evaluations are not complementary in the sense that the project can
be valuable without their joint realization and syndication deters potential competition.
Last, our emphasis on the importance of information aggregation for financial decisions re-
lates to the research field on the role of experts and certification in economics and finance. In
some of that literature, experts are viewed as intermediaries who transmit information from
informed to uninformed parties, and researchers have focused on the various incentives of each
party (see Lizzeri (1999) on the incentives of intermediaries to manipulate information, Faure-
Grimaud, Peyrache and Quesada (2006) on the incentives of (informed) firms to effectively use
that information, or Morrison and White (2006) on the externalities created by screening, in a
model of bank regulation). Another branch of the literature emphasizes the incentive problems
between a principal and experts (see Gromb and Martimort (2004) on the use of multiple experts
to save on agency costs, Gerardi, MacLean, and Postlewaite (2005) on the optimal arrangement
to aggregate information, and Baron and Besanko (1999) on the formation of informational al-
liance among experts). While all of that literature emphasizes information revelation problems,
and focuses on the transmission of information to uninformed principals, we consider venture
capitalists as principals, and do not study issues of information revelation.
The organization of the paper is the following. The next section presents the model and
assumptions. Section 3 derives the socially optimal aggregation of information and investment
decisions. Section 4 introduces the cost of potential competition between venture capitalists
and provides a rationale for syndication. Section 5 analyses the syndication decision and the
screening process when the initial venture capitalist is under the threat of potential competition.
Section 6 introduces another cost of syndication when effort is not observable. Section 7 derives
empirical predictions and proposes new tests. The last section concludes. Proofs are provided
in the appendix, except those directly derived from the text.
2 The model
We consider the situation faced by a risk-neutral, cash-poor entrepreneur who needs an initial
outlay I to start an innovative investment project. The project yields a verifiable risky outcome
R˜. For simplicity, we assume that the project can either succeed or fail, hence R˜ can take two
values: R > 0 in case of success and 0 in case of failure. The probability of success depends on
the quality of the project. If the project is good, the probability of success is ph (thus 1− ph is
the probability of failure of a good project), while if the project is bad, the probability of success
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is pl < ph.9 We assume that only good projects are profitable. With risk-neutral agents, and a
riskless interest rate normalized to zero, this implies that:
phR > I > plR.
Since we are concerned with a new, innovative project, the true quality of the project is
initially unknown. Denote q0 the a priori probability that the quality of the project is good.
This prior is common knowledge.
The entrepreneur must raise funds from outside investors. Some of those investors have
specific expertise in financing innovative projects. We call them venture capitalists (hereafter
VC) and assume they have the following characteristics. First, VCs have the ability to better
identify the true quality of the projects they are proposed, while traditional, non-specialized
investors cannot.10 This assumption reflects the fact that VCs concentrate their investments
in specific lines of business and can use their expertise to infer the quality of new projects.
Consequently, we assume that venture capitalists can complete an investment analysis, to obtain
a signal related to the project true quality. For simplicity, we assume that generating this signal
is costless.11 This signal can be either good (s = H) or bad (s = L) and is all the more precise
that the venture capitalist's expertise is high. In other words, all venture capitalists have the
ability to screen projects, but they have different levels of observable ability. This assumption
captures the idea that although specialized in the same line of business, some venture capitalists
may be more experienced than others. Formally, the signal si received by a venture capitalist
with expertise αi has the following properties:
prob(si = H/ph) = αi,
prob(si = L/pl) = αi,
where αi ∈ [12 ; 1]. The probability of receiving a good signal conditional on a project being
good increases with the venture capitalist's expertise. After observing a signal, the venture
capitalist updates his belief on the project's quality using Bayes' rule.
Second, VCs can also use their expertise to provide business advice once the project has been
funded.12 Correspondingly, we assume that VCs can exert a costly contractible effort13 that
9In the remaining of the paper, we will indifferently refer to a good project, or to a project with success
probability ph to denote a project of good quality.
10See Sahlman (1988, 1990) for instance.
11In standard models of sequential competition, such fixed costs could in principle constitute barriers to entry,
and play a strategic role (see Bain (1956)). This is not the case in our model, since the second VC's entry depends
exclusively on the first VC's willingness to let him entry. Therefore, introducing a fixed cost to generate the signal
does not qualitatively modify the results, but heavily burdens the presentation of the model.
12See Gompers and Lerner (1999) or Hellmann and Puri (2002).
13In a first step, we leave aside incentive issues, and focus on the interaction between the perceived project
quality, the investment, and the effort decision. The assumption of contractible effort is relaxed in section 6.
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increases the probability of success of the project, if the true quality is good. To keep things
simple, there are only two possible levels of effort. If the VC exerts effort (decision e), he incurs
a private cost c > 0 and increases the probability of success of a good project by ² > 0 (the
probability of success of a bad project remains unchanged). If the VC does not exert effort
(decision 6 e), the probability of success remains unchanged. The assumption that effort affects
only good projects is motivated by the fact that the returns to "living dead" projects are typically
very low (close to zero), whatever the effort of the VCs. Bad projects in our model refer to those
types of projects.14 Another important assumption is that only one agent needs to exert effort.15
This is in line with casual observation about the role of the lead venture capital investor in a VC
syndicate. As pointed by Wright and Lockett (2003) page 2085, "the degree of contact between
the members of the syndicate and the investee is anticipated to differ according to their role.
Absent this asymmetry of contact, there would be a considerable degree of duplication of effort
between the lead and non-lead firms". Using survey data on the UK VC industry, Wright and
Lockett (2003) find that lead VCs are more hands-on in monitoring, more likely to have frequent
contacts with investees, and that they have more access to management-based information. We
follow the features of the industry by assuming that only one effort is needed.16
The net present value of the project depends on the agents' beliefs, the project's quality, and
the effort decision. Denote qsi the updated belief after a signal si is generated and qsi,sj the
updated belief after two signals si and sj . For instance, after one signal, the NPV is written:
NPV (e, qsi) = −I − c+ qsi(ph + ²)R+ (1− qsi) plR, (1)
if the effort is exerted, and:
NPV (6 e, qsi) = −I + qsi(ph)R+ (1− qsi) plR, (2)
if the VC does not exert effort. Consistent with the fact that very innovative projects,
while potentially highly profitable, also have a highly uncertain quality, the a priori NPV of the
project is negative, whatever the effort decision. Therefore, the entrepreneur needs to rely on
VC financing to implement his project.
14An important question is to what extent our results depend on this specification. The current specification
allows us to obtain investment regimes in which it is optimal to invest and not to exert effort. Such regimes also
occur if we take a multiplicative and symmetric effort term, where the probability of success p is multiplied by
(1+ ²) for all types of projects. But they will disappear for instance with an additive and symmetric value-adding
term. In that case, effort is always exerted when investment takes place, as long as ²R− c > 0. This specification
generates a perfect correlation between the investment and the effort decision, and prevents us from studying the
intensity of the effort exerted, according to the perceived quality of the project.
15We thus abstract from moral hazard in team problems.
16Note however that this needs not be the case for other types of syndicates. See for instance Pichler and
Wilhelm (2001) for an analysis of moral hazard in team in the investment banking industry.
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The timing of the game is the following. The entrepreneur proposes an investment opportu-
nity to a first VC (labelled VC1), who generates a signal s1. Then, VC1 can:
• either reject the project,
• or stop collecting information and invest immediately,
• or call for a second evaluation performed by a second VC, labelled VC2.
In the latter case, we assume that the signals are freely observed by the two VCs.17 Last,
if (and after) the project is implemented, VC1 takes the effort decision.18
3 Optimal information aggregation and investment decision
In this section, we determine VC1's optimal information gathering and investment policy. We
assume that VC1 is able to capture all the project surplus, so that he maximizes the project's
NPV.19 VC1 asks for a second evaluation each time it increases the project's expected NPV,
compared to the current NPV. This implies that at least one realization of the second signal
must modify the initial investment decision. If not, the expected value of the project given s2 is
equal to the value of the project given s1. Formally, s2 is generated if and only if:
max{0;NPV (e, qs1);NPV ( 6 e, qs1)} ≤ Es2 max{0;NPV (e, qs1,s2);NPV (6 e, qs1,s2)}
To keep the analysis as rich as possible, we want to ensure that it is sometimes optimal to in-
vest, but not to exert effort. It must be the case that for some α1, NPV (6 e, qs1)> NPV (e, qs1) >
0. Otherwise, the decision to invest would immediately trigger effort. Intuitively, this is the case
if the effort is not very efficient, which is formally stated in the next assumption.
Assumption 1 Effort is not very efficient:
c(ph − pl) ≥ ²(I − plR). (3)
17See Biais and Perotti (2003) or Cestone, White and Lerner (2006) on the issue of privately observed signals.
18Alternatively, the effort could be decided by VC2: the identity of the lead VC investor does not modify the
results.
19The model can easily be extended to the case where the entrepreneur has a fixed fraction of surplus. Also,
this assumption can be an equilibrium outcome in specific bilateral negotiation games -see Casamatta and Har-
itchabalet (2006).
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Figure 1 represents the optimal information aggregation and investment decision of VC1,
according to his, as well as the other VC's, level of experience. The x axis measures the level
of experience of VC1, while the y axis measures the level of experience of VC2.20 This figure
describes the choice made by VC1 for any couple {α1;α2}.21The figure restricts to the case where
VC1 has received a good signal. In the dotted lines regions, VC1 does not collect the second
signal, and makes his investment decision alone. In the plain regions, he collects the second
signal : investment and effort decisions are specified according to the realization of the second
signal.
When α1 is below a threshold αI , in the lower left side of the picture, VC1 prefers not to
invest alone even after a good signal. He then needs a second evaluation to confirm his own
appraisal. Note that the more confident VC1 is about his own evaluation, the less precise the
second evaluation has to be to confirm his signal. Consequently, one observes that the minimum
level of VC2's experience to collect s2 decreases with VC1's experience: it is represented by the
decreasing curve ϕI, 6e(α1).
When VC1 is more experienced (above αI), in the lower right side of the picture, he invests
if he obtains a good signal. A second piece of information can be useful to deter investment. In
that case, the more experienced VC1 is, the higher must be the experience of VC2 to make him
change his mind: this effect is represented by the increasing curve ϕ 6I, 6e(α1).
The second piece of information can also be used to modify the effort decision. For instance,
if VC1 is moderately experienced and obtains a good signal (i.e. if α1 ∈ [αI , αe]), he prefers to
invest and not to exert effort unless he receives a second good signal. The experience of VC2
required to exert effort decreases then with VC1's own experience (see the curve ϕe(α1)). The
opposite arises when VC1 is very experienced and is discouraged to exert effort after bad news
from VC2 (see the curve ϕ6e(α1)).
The above discussion is summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 The minimum level of experience of VC2 increases (decreases) with VC1's own
experience when they disagree (agree) on the investment or effort decision.
20A detailed explanation for the determination of the different functions and variables is provided in the ap-
pendix.
21We have not considered the optimal choice of VC2's experience. This is because in our setting, the optimal
value of α2 is trivially 1. We implicitly assume that choosing exactly the level of experience of VC2 might be
impossible or difficult. The venture capital industry may be more or less well developed, which restrains the
set of available levels of VC experience. Even when experienced VCs exist in the economy, time constraints may
prevent a given VC to actually process an investment candidate, which reduces again the set of available syndicate
partners. A way to model this would be to introduce a matching technology that randomly draws the level of
experience α2 available to VC1 when he wants to syndicate.
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Figure 1: Optimal Information gathering when s1 = H.
Note that these results rely on the dynamics of q induced by bayesian updating. In particular,
they do not rely on our specific binary investment model. To assess this, we present in appendix
page 28 a continuous investment version of our generic model and state that the results of
proposition 1 are qualitatively unchanged.
4 Potential competition between venture capitalists
The previous paragraph determined the information aggregation and investment decision when
VC1 is able to capture the project's NPV. We now introduce the possibility that VC2 proposes
a competing offer to the entrepreneur, if he is contacted by VC1. Asking for a second piece of
information becomes costly for VC1: disclosing the investment opportunity to the second VC
destroys his monopoly position.22 To determine the optimal information aggregation strategy of
22This is however different from standard sequential competition models, because VC1 decides whether or not
to allow VC2 to enter the market: there is no threat of entry from VC2, and there is no room for entry-deterrence
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VC1, we first need to determine what pay-offs can be obtained by each party if VC2 is contacted.
4.1 The outcome of potential competition
The timing of the game is modified as follows: if VC1 discloses the project to a second VC, we
assume that both VCs observe freely the two signals s1 and s2 generated by their analyses. After
information is observed, they can either make competing (separate) offers, or negotiate and make
a joint offer. This timing implicitly assumes that competing offers cannot be ruled out, i.e. that
VC1 cannot write a non competing agreement with VC2. This assumption can be justified by
the fact that i) since VC1 has not invested into the project yet, he cannot claim to have property
rights over the project, that could rule out competing offers; ii) forcing the second VC to sign
a non-competing clause goes against all competition enhancing policies. We will come back to
this point when discussing the possible contractual arrangements between VCs.
To solve the model, we now describe the outcome of the game if VCs do make competing
offers. Offers are simultaneous. If the project's NPV (conditional on the signals) is negative,
neither VC1 nor VC2 will propose to finance the entrepreneur's project. If the project's NPV
is positive, each VC separately proposes a financial agreement to the entrepreneur, specifying
the share of financial income (denoted δi, i ∈ {1, 2}) that they require in exchange for the initial
investment I. Since the two VCs have the same evaluation, the game thus boils down to standard
Bertrand competition. At equilibrium, we thus have δ1 = δ2, and each VC earns zero profit in
expectation.
Alternatively, the two VCs can negotiate for a joint offer23 to share the project's NPV.
We make the assumption that such a joint offer does not modify the entrepreneur's bargaining
power.24 As is standard in this type of setting, the bargaining between the two VCs leads to the
Nash solution: when the VCs have the same bargaining power, they split evenly the surplus from
negotiation.25 If negotiation fails, as stated above, the two VCs engage in Bertrand competition
and obtain zero profits. Their reservation utility in the bargaining process is thus equal to zero,
strategies by VC1, as in Spence (1977) or Dixit (1979). This is also why introducing costly signals will not involve
strategic, barrier-to-entry effects in the model.
23This assumption departs from Garmaise (2006) who focuses on competition between VCs, in an asymmetric
information setting.
24If the entrepreneur's bargaining power increases with the number of investors, that will creates an additional
cost of syndication, and reinforce our result that syndication is costly, especially for the most experienced VCs.
For simplicity, we choose not to include this cost in the analysis. Note also that our assumption is consistent with
the way we view syndication: the entrepreneur bargains with a syndicate, and not with two (separate) investors.
From the entrepreneur's point of view, there is thus no difference between bargaining with a single investor and
with a syndicate.
25Relaxing the assumption of equal bargaining power, by allowing for instance the bargaining power of each
party to increase with his relative level of experience, does not modify qualitatively the results.
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and the surplus from negotiation is equal to the project's NPV. Each VC thus obtains half of
the project's NPV from negotiating.
The cost of gathering information incurred by VC1 appears now clearly. If he sticks to his
own evaluation, he enjoys a monopoly position, and captures the whole project's NPV. If however
he calls for a second evaluation, because of the threat of competition, he cannot capture more
than half of the project's NPV. Intuitively, there will be cases where the second signal is valuable
(i.e. it increases the NPV), but VC1 loses too much to be willing to gather information. VC1's
incentives to gather information will be analyzed more formally in section 5.
4.2 The contractual arrangement between VCs
We now investigate which contracts can implement the Nash bargaining solution. The contrac-
tual elements can be contingent on the following verifiable variables: the amount invested, the
investment decision and the final income generated by the project. We thus exclude signals from
being part of the contract. Indeed, although signals are observable by the two VCs, it is very
unlikely that they can be verifiable by an outside court. Last, contracts are signed after signals
are observed.
A contract determines i) VCi's contribution to the total initial outlay I, denoted Ci(I), with∑
iCi(I) = I ii) VCi's return according to the final income Ri(R˜)26 and iii) transfers between
VCs at the investment date, denoted Ti, such that
∑
i Ti = 0. Any contract {Ci(I);Ri(R˜);Ti}
verifying ∀i:
Ti − Ci(I) + ER˜Ri(R˜) =
1
2
NPV(s1, s2),
implements the Nash-bargaining solution. Examples of possible contracts are:
Ex. 1:

T1 = −12NPV T2 = 12NPV
C1(I) = I C2(I) = 0
R1(R) = R R2(R) = 0.
Ex. 2:

T1 = 0 T2 = 0
−C1(I) + ER˜R1(R˜) = 12NPV
−C2(I) + ER˜R2(R˜) = 12NPV
C1(I) + C2(I) = I
R1(R) +R2(R) = R,with Ri ≥ 0
Example 1 is a contract whereby VC1 buys to VC2 the right to be the sole investor in the
project: the initial transfer compensates VC2 accordingly. Example 2 is a contract involving no
initial transfer. Note that all contracts in the form of Example 2 involve co-ownership of the
firm by the two VCs. Indeed, even if one VC's contribution is nul (Ci = 0), he receives a strictly
positive share of equity (Ri(R) > 0). In the remainder of the analysis, such contracts involving
no initial transfers will be denoted syndicated investments.
26Recall that R˜ can take two values: R or 0. Quite plausibly, we assume limited liability:
∑
iRi(R˜) ≤ R˜ and
Ri(R˜) ≥ 0. This implies that R1(0) = R2(0) = 0.
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In principle, all types of contracts are equally valid. We view contracts with transfers as less
likely, since venture capital investments are typically governed by restrictive fund covenants.27 It
is plausible that setting transfers from one fund to another generates additional costs to circum-
vent the funds investment restrictions. For these reasons, we argue that syndicated investments,
where the two VCs are co-owners of the firm, are the most frequent contractual arrangements to
implement the Nash-bargaining solution.
The contracts derived above are decided upon after observing signals, which seems more
in line with practice. It is important though to discuss what would happen if contracts could
be signed before disclosing the project to the second VC, in the spirit of the ex-ante contracts
considered in Anton and Yao (1994).28 Clearly, the investment contract proposed by VC1 to VC2
before disclosing the project is plagued by asymmetric information, because VC2 does not know
VC1's signal yet. Separating contracts would typically entail that VC1 keeps a higher fraction
of returns, and invests a higher fraction of investment to credibly signal his good evaluation.29
But, our model is different in that VC1 does not need to sell his project to VC2, but only needs a
second piece of information. Avoiding to trade with VC2 allows him to save on adverse selection
costs. The (rather trivial) optimal contract is simply for VC1 to propose to invest alone and to
get all the proceeds from the investment, whatever his signal. This is exactly the non competing
contract that we ruled out previously. One reason for ruling it out (on top of such contracts
being illegal in practice) is that it might not be robust to collusion with a third VC. Even if VC2
commits not to invest in the project after observing the two signals, it should be hard to prevent
him from making a competing offer through another fund. Another reason for not considering
such contracts would be to consider that the second signal is not publicly observed. In that case,
VC1 would need to offer an incentive compatible contract to make VC2 reveal his information:
this would give rise to informational rents, and the ex-ante contract described above would not be
optimal.30 The cost of information revelation is studied in other models of information gathering
(Biais and Perotti (2003), Cestone, Lerner and White (2006)), and we focus here on the cost of
potential competition.
27See Gompers and Lerner (1996) for an analysis of such covenants.
28In theory, one could also conceive to sign contracts even before the first VC receives his signal, specifying
what would be the investment contract if VC1 contacts VC2: considering contracts signed after the first signal
amounts for VC1 to select his preferred contract in the class of ex-ante contracts.
29A similar feature arises in Anton and Yao (1994) who show that such ex-ante contracts are possible if the
seller (VC1) does not have limited liability, and can signal the quality of his project by guaranteeing possible
future losses of the buyer.
30We thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.
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5 The decision to syndicate
In this section, we investigate when syndication actually takes place and compare the syn-
dication decision to the efficient information aggregation derived in section 3. The trade-off
faced by VC1 is now the following. He can rely on his own evaluation and enjoy a monopoly
position. Alternatively, he can call for a second evaluation that yields more precise information
on the project's true quality. In that case, VC1 gives up half of the monopoly profits to avoid
competition as stated in section 4. Formally, VC1 chooses to syndicate if and only if:
max{0;NPV (e,qs1 );NPV (6e,qs1)}≤Es2 12 max{0;NPV (e,qs1,s2 );NPV (6e,qs1,s2 )}.
We then compare this syndication decision to the optimal information gathering strategy
(from section 3).
Proposition 2 If VC1 is rather inexperienced (in the sense that α1 ≤ αI) or if VC1 has received
a bad signal, syndication occurs whenever information gathering is optimal. The threshold αI is
defined in the appendix page 27.
Proposition 2 means that potential competition has no incidence on inexperienced (or pes-
simistic) VCs. The intuition is the following: inexperienced VCs are not able to screen efficiently
the projects under evaluation. Therefore they have nothing to lose when contacting a second
evaluator (their monopoly profits are equal to zero). Since syndication is costless, it takes place
each time the second piece of information is valuable, and the project is profitable. The same
is true if VC1 receives a bad signal: it is not profitable to invest alone, and VC1 contacts VC2
anytime his information is valuable, as defined in section 3. Both the realization of the signal
and the experience of the venture capitalist determine the extent to which he is hurt by potential
competition.
Proposition 3 Potential competition between VCs affects the screening process in the following
way:
• an experienced VC1, in the sense that α1 ∈ [αI , αe], demands a higher than optimal level
of VC2's experience to form a syndicate.
• A very experienced VC1, in the sense that α1 > αe, never forms a syndicate and forgoes
gathering information.
The threshold αe is defined in the appendix page 27.
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When VC1 is rather experienced, his evaluation is precise enough to find it profitable to invest
alone. As a consequence, syndication is costly because VC1 has to give up positive monopoly
profits. To compensate this loss, he requires a more precise signal s2 (compared to the first
best), hence a more experienced partner. Since the monopoly profits of VC1 increase with his
level of experience, he is more and more reluctant to syndicate (or, he requires more and more
experienced partners): this may reach the point at which no level of VC2's experience satisfies
VC1's requirement. In those cases, the cost of potential competition is too large compared to the
benefits of more precise information. This does not happen in the first best since, unless VC1
has perfect information, there always exists a degree of precision such that the second piece of
information is valuable.
Corollary 1 Potential competition leads to overinvestment when VC1 is sufficiently experienced
(in the sense that α1 > αI).
The intuition of corollary 1 is the following. When VC1 is sufficiently experienced so that he
can invest alone after a good signal, the evaluation made by a second VC is valuable to discourage
investment in case of a bad signal s2. Because of potential competition, VC1 does not gather
information each time it is optimal to do so, and invests too much.
Corollary 2 Potential competition leads to overprovision (resp. underprovision) of effort when
VC1's experience is greater (resp. smaller) than αe.
When VC1 is the sole investor, he exerts the optimal level of effort given his own information.
When he is very experienced (i.e. when αi ≥ αe, he always exerts effort if his signal is good,
while a bad signal s2 could be used to discourage effort (if α2 > ϕ6e(α1), as depicted on figure
1). At the opposite, when VC1 is moderately experienced (i.e. when αi ∈ [αI , αe], he never
exerts effort if his signal is good, while a good signal s2 would encourage effort (if α2 > ϕe(α1)).
When potential competition deprives VC1 of the second evaluation, he exerts too much effort in
those cases where the second signal would have discouraged effort, and where VC1 prefers not to
contact VC2. Similarly, he exerts too little effort in those cases where the second signal would
have encouraged effort, and where VC1 does not contact a second evaluator.
The results stated in propositions 2 and 3 and in corollaries 1 and 2 are illustrated in figure
2 (for the case where s1 = H). As before, the dotted line regions represent the zones where VC1
does not contact a second venture capitalist after receiving a good signal. The plain (white)
regions represent the zones where VC1 contacts VC2, and forms a syndicate when investment
takes place. Each region specifies the optimal investment and effort decisions according to the
signals and the levels of experience. It is useful to compare figure 2 and figure 1 to understand how
potential competition alters the aggregation of information, as well as the investment decisions.
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Figure 2: Syndication decision when s1 = H.
First, inexperienced VCs are not affected by the cost of potential competition: when α1 < αI ,
both figures coincide, and the threshold above which VC1 calls for a second expertise remains
the same (ϕI, 6e(α1)). This illustrates the result of proposition 2: there is no cost to syndicate
for inexperienced VCs since they have nothing to lose. Second, the information gathering region
shrinks when the experience of VC1 grows. For instance, when α1 ∈ [αI , αe], figure 1 teaches us
that VC1 should contact VC2 whenever α2 ≥ ϕ 6I, 6e(α1) and refrain from investing if the second
signal is bad. From figure 2 one can see that VC1 contacts VC2 to refrain from investing if
α2 ≥ ϕs, 6I, 6e(α1) > ϕ 6I,6e(α1). This is the cost of potential competition highlighted in proposition
3: competition prevents VC1 from collecting a second evaluation each time he should. Third, the
cost of syndication increases with VC1's experience and can finally deter information gathering.
This effect is easily seen in the case where VC1 is very experienced (α1 > αe). The information
gathering zone (when α2 > ϕ 6e(α1)) has disappeared from figure 2. Last, observe that one
region, that was defined by α2 ∈ [max[ϕe(α1), ϕ 6e(α1)], ϕ6I, 6e(α1)] completely disappears: this is
the region where the second signal is used to modify the effort, but not the investment decision.
As a consequence, a moderately experienced VC1 exerts too little effort and a very experienced
VC1 exerts too much effort as stated in corollary 2.
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6 Syndication and unobservable effort
In the previous sections, we assumed that the effort decision was contractible to abstract from
moral hazard issues. We now relax this assumption and assume that the effort exerted by VC1
is unobservable and cannot be contracted upon. In our simple setting, if VC1 remains the sole
investor, moral hazard is irrelevant: VC1 is the only owner of the firm, he reaps the full benefit
of effort, and is always induced to exert effort whenever it is optimal to do so (conditional on his
information).
If VC1 decides to form a syndicate, his effort decision might be altered because he has to
concede a fraction 1−γ of equity to VC2.31 VC1 still bears the full cost of his effort, but recoups
only a fraction of the benefit, which can weaken his incentives to exert effort. Define γmax (< 1)
the maximal share of equity that VC1 can keep with a syndication contract; γmax corresponds
to the case where β = 1, and is defined by (in the case where effort is profitable):
γmax =
(
1
2NPV (e, q) + I + c
)
q(ph + ²)R+ (1− q)plR.
Also, the incentive compatibility condition ensuring that VC1 prefers to exert effort given his
stake in the firm γ is written:
γ ≥ c
q²R
.
Therefore, VC1 syndicates and exerts effort if γ ∈ [ cq²R , γmax]. As long as this interval
exists, moral hazard has no bite because it is always possible to set γ such that VC1 exerts the
optimal effort level. In the case where the interval does not exist, it is not possible to induce
VC1 to exert effort although it would be optimal to do so. In that case, syndication between
VCs leads to underprovision of effort.
When is syndication likely to deter effort ? As illustrated in figure 2, if VC1 syndicates, it is
optimal to exert effort when α2 > ϕe(α1). This means that along the curve representing ϕe(α1),
c
q²R = 1, and VC1 exerts effort if and only if he owns 100% of the firm's equity. Clearly, for α2
slightly above ϕe(α1), VC1 forms a syndicate to invest, and has too small a stake in the firm to
be induced to exert effort: the interval [ cq²R , γmax] does not exist. It follows from the previous
discussion that there exists a region above ϕe(α1) where it is optimal to exert effort, but where
it is not possible to induce VC1 to do so.
This gives the following proposition which is graphically illustrated with a numerical example
in the appendix page 33.
31Note that in our setting, equity is an optimal contract to induce one agent to exert effort. This is because
the final income can only be R or 0: it is not possible to distinguish between debt, equity, or any other financial
contract.
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Proposition 4 Moral hazard leads to underprovision of effort under syndication, i.e. when VC1
is not very experienced.
The previous section points out one cost of potential competition, which is the insufficient
aggregation of information and inefficient screening process. Because they have more to lose
when forming a syndicate, experienced VCs essentially bear this cost. Inexperienced VCs are
immune from the threat of potential competition and can aggregate through syndication all
valuable information. This section highlights another cost of syndication that is borne primarily
by inexperienced VCs. When effort is not observable, there is a tension between the need to
give up a fraction of the firm's equity to form a syndicate and the need to keep enough shares
to be induced to work. We show that this tension leads to underprovision of effort. Note that
moral hazard affects the regions where syndication takes place. Intuitively, since there is less
syndication for more experienced VCs, this cost decreases with VC1's experience.
7 Empirical predictions and possible tests
This model allows to derive a number of empirical predictions concerning the formation of
syndicates (who syndicates with whom, and for which projects), the post-investment involvement
of the syndicate partners, as well as the profitability of syndicated investments. We present
below the main predictions of our model, and try to assess their empirical relevance compared to
alternative explanations of syndication. Finally, we suggest possible empirical tests to fit more
accurately our predictions.
The empirical predictions of our model
• A central prediction of our model is that the level of experience of venture capitalists should be a
major determinant of their decision to syndicate. In particular, standalone investments should be
performed by highly experienced VCs. In our model this happens for two reasons. The first one is
rather obvious: more experienced VCs are able to screen more efficiently projects, and circumvent
more accurately the project risk. Therefore, there is less need for syndication. The second one is
directly linked to the cost of disclosing deals to potential competitors: because they have more
accurate evaluations, experienced VCs are more vulnerable to potential competition. In other
words, experienced VCs have more to lose when disclosing a deal. Having a higher cost and a
lower benefit of forming a syndicate, they syndicate less. While the first argument was already
recognized in the literature (Lerner (1994)), the second is specific to our paper. We believe that
the second argument is important, in particular for early stage investments, where uncertainty
is so high that even experienced VCs could benefit from the assessment of a peer. According
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to our analysis, what refrains them from syndicating is the cost of losing monopoly rents. This
prediction is supported by various empirical findings: studying a sample of biotech investments,
Lerner (1994) finds that experienced VCs syndicate with similarly experienced VCs. In addition,
Hopp and Rieder (2006) document from a sample of German venture capital investments that
more experienced VCs syndicate much less than their inexperienced counterparts. For instance,
VC firms which have undertaken more deals syndicate less, as well as those which have undertaken
a larger proportion of their deals in Germany.
• Our results also imply that, other things equal, the uncertainty of the portfolio firms, or of
the industry where VCs invest in, should have an influence on the level of syndication of venture
capitalists. Indeed the venture capitalists' ability to generate precise signals on the projects'
quality (αi in the model) also depends on the general level of uncertainty of those projects.
Presumably, the venture capital industry ability to screen projects, should be lower the younger
the firm, or the more innovative the firm's business. For those projects or industries, it is unlikely
that VCs with very high αi exist. As a consequence, one should observe more syndication for
those industries. This is supported by evidence both at the firm, and at the industry level.
Different papers have reported that syndication is positively related to the level of uncertainty of
projects (Bygrave (1987), Chiplin and Wright (1997), Amit, Brander, and Antweiler (2002)), or
to the age of the funded firms, early stage firms exhibiting more syndication (Hopp and Rieder
(2006)). Some papers have also reported that the industry itself is an important determinant of
syndication. Hopp and Rieder (2006) find that more mature industries, like industrial products
and services, exhibit much lower levels of syndication that the biotech or internet sectors (see
also Lehman and Boschker (2006)). To the extent that projects in mature industries are more
easily readable (say, because comparisons are easier, valuations based on ratio comparisons more
accurate), the precision of VCs signals is likely to be higher than in more innovative sectors.
• An original feature of our analysis is to study jointly two sources of value-added of venture
capitalists, which are usually investigated separately in the literature, namely their ability to
screen projects, and their ability to provide value-enhancing advice. Our predictions are two-
fold. First, because inexperienced VCs syndicate, they do not exert enough effort. This is
because syndicate members have to share the returns from the project, which can discourage the
lead VC's effort. Note however that syndication does not necessarily imply underprovision of
effort: When expected returns are quite high, it is possible to conceive an incentive compatible
return sharing scheme. As a consequence, underprovision of effort because of syndication is more
likely when (some) syndicate members are inexperienced (i.e. when expected returns are not
very high). Second, the model predicts that experienced VCs who invest alone should provide
more effort, and sometimes too much effort. Because of their high cost of syndicating deals,
experienced VCs may overestimate the quality of projects, which, together with them being the
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sole investor, induces them to exert too much effort.32 The fact that very experienced VCs
exert more effort is consistent with Sapienza et al. (1996). This is also in line with Kaplan
and Strömberg (2004) who find i) a positive relationship between value-added activities and the
equity stake of venture capitalists, and ii) a negative relationship between the size of syndicates
and value-added activities. Last, our results stress the fact that whether syndication triggers
more effort than standalone investments depends on the level of experience of VCs: in particular,
moderately experienced VCs should exert more effort when they form a syndicate.
• Our model allows to discuss whether standalone investments should exhibit more or less
variable returns than syndicated investments. Brander et al. (2002) find in their sample that
standalone investments have less variable returns. The predictions we can derive from the model
are less clearcut, but can shed light on the determinants of the variability of returns of VC
investments. On the one hand, experienced VCs (who invest alone) have more precise signals:
their investments should exhibit less variable returns. On the other hand, experienced VCs who
find it too costly to syndicate accept too many projects: in that case, their standalone investments
should exhibit more variable returns. Our analysis states that highly experienced VCs benefit
from the positive precision-of-signal effect, but suffer from relying on their own information only.
The investments of less experienced VCs exhibit exactly the opposite features: each piece of
information is less precise, but those VCs manage to syndicate, which improves their selection
process. Which effect dominates according to the level of experience of VCs is still an empirical
issue.
• Last, an important question is whether syndicated projects are more or less profitable than
standalone projects. The empirical evidence is mixed. Brander et al. (2002) find a positive
relationship between syndication and the return of portfolio firms. But they also find that
syndicated investment have higher volatility than stand-alone investments. Hopp and Rieder
(2006) document that syndication has a positive effect on sales growth. However they find
no significant impact of the number of syndicated members on the sales growth. Using more
appropriate performance measures, Hege, Palomino and Schwienbacher (2006) find no significant
relationship between the size of the syndicate and the level of excess returns. In our model, the
relationship between syndication and expected returns depends on the level of experience of
VCs. The important point is that syndicated investments can exhibit higher expected returns
than standalone investments.33 This result is to be contrasted to the result of Brander et al.
(2002). They predict lower expected returns for syndicated projects, when syndication is used
32Overprovision of effort arises in our model from the assumption that the efficiency of the VC's effort increases
with the quality of the project: it is therefore optimal not to exert effort if it is unlikely that the project is good.
Note that with constant effort efficiency, experienced VCs who cannot syndicate would invest too much, and also
exert too much effort: our predictions would be unchanged, but the current specification allows to disantangle
the investment decision from the effort decision.
33We provide in the appendix page 33 a numerical example to highlight this point.
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for a screening motive. We complement their work by showing that this result depends crucially
on the level of experience of VCs.
Comparison with alternative motives of syndication
Several motives for syndication are traditionally proposed in the literature (although not relying
on formal models). One possible reason for syndication is the capital constraint of venture
capitalists: some deals may simply be too large to be undertaken by a single VC who might not
have enough funds, or might be prevented by his fund's covenants to invest a large amount in
a single firm. The argument would imply the following empirical patterns: one should observe
that syndication at any given round of investment increases with the size of the deals, and
decreases with the size of the venture capital fund. To the extent that early stage rounds involve
generally less financial investment than later stage rounds, the capital constraint hypothesis also
implies that there is less syndication at earlier stages, and more syndication at later stages. This
prediction is exactly the opposite of what our model suggests: when uncertainty is high (earlier
stages) there is a greater need to gather information, and VCs' signals are unlikely to be very
precise, which should result in more syndicated deals. Some empirical evidence seems to speak
against the capital constraint motive as the only reason for syndication. For instance, Hopp and
Rieder (2006) report that syndication is not related to the amount of capital under management:
large VC funds do not syndicate less than small counterparts. Also, anecdotal evidence on
UK venture capital investments suggests that the size of syndicates is smaller at later stages,
while amounts invested are larger (Wright and Lockett (2003)). It is plausible though that
capital constraints play, in some instances, a role in the decision to syndicate. Our model simply
suggests an alternative, and possibly complementary rationale for syndication: while early stage
syndication may be due to the need to gather information, later stage syndication may simply
reflect some capital constraints of VC funds. Last, the capital constraint argument is agnostic
concerning some of the empirical predictions we suggest. If syndication was only a matter of
investment size, it is not obvious why this should affect the level of effort of syndicate members
(even if each syndicate member has a lower share of equity, the total project value is higher, and
effort should not be affected), or their decision of who to syndicate with.
Another reason usually put forward is the risk diversification motive: VCs syndicate deals
to invest in more projects, and to hold a more diversified portfolio. We are not aware of any
evidence that directly tests this assumption. From a theoretical point of view though, it is not
clear why VCs should care about diversification at the fund level, and why syndication should
be the tool to mitigate risk. First, limited partners who invest in VC funds are institutional
investors who only invest a small portion of their endowments in the venture capital sector, and
who can invest in several VC funds. It is not clear why there is also a need to diversify at the
fund level from the investors point of view. In addition, if the VC firms themselves want to
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mitigate risk, they can achieve this through the management of several funds, each dedicated to
a specific line of business, or geographic area. It is thus rather uneasy to derive predictions from
the risk mitigation motive. Some empirical evidence by Hopp and Rieder (2006) find that the
concentration of VC portfolios increases with syndication. If any, this suggests that syndication is
not used to hold a diversified portfolio of firms in different lines of business. While we believe that
the risk mitigation motive bears some relevance, it seems unlikely that it is the only determinant
of the decision to syndicate. Also, diversification per se cannot explain some usually observed
patterns of syndication, in particular the fact that experienced VCs syndicate less, and more
likely with their peers.
Last, several models view syndication as an optimal investment arrangement. Building on
Lerner (1994)'s idea that syndication can improve the selection process, Brander et al. (2002)
propose two alternative models of syndication, relying respectively on information gathering,
and on value-added. We use different assumptions, which lead to different predictions. First, we
explicitly consider the level of experience in the syndication decision, while they do not. This
allows us to derive predictions linking the level of experience, to the syndication decision, to the
ex-post involvement of VCs, and to the characteristics of VC investments in terms of variance
and return. We already discussed above to which extent these predictions fit some empirical
evidence. Second, by construction in their model, syndicated projects exhibit more value-added
from VCs than standalone investments (since it is one reason for syndication). We enrich their
analysis by considering simultaneously the selection process and effort decision. This allows us to
predict that experienced VCs syndicate less and provide more effort. Such a prediction was not
possible in their framework. Cestone, Lerner, and White (2006) have more recently proposed a
model of syndication to gather signals. Their assumptions differ from ours on several dimensions.
They consider privately observed signals, and investigate the incentive costs of syndication, while
we focus on observable signals and explore the potential competition costs of syndication. Our
predictions partly differ in the sense that highly experienced VCs in their model do not always
prefer to syndicate with experienced counterparts, because of the high incentive costs. In our
model, if one VC wants to syndicate, he always prefers the most experienced partner available.
In addition, our analysis of the provision of effort is absent in their model, so that some of our
predictions are irrelevant in their analysis. Finally, Bachman and Schindele (2006) motivate
syndication as a commitment device not to steal the entrepreneur's idea : in particular, they
derive predictions relating the syndication size to the extent of legal protection of ideas, which
are different and possibly complementary to ours.
Possible tests of our model
Some available empirical evidence fits well the implications of our analysis, but could also fit
alternative explanations. One way to disentangle our predictions from others is to think about
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more specific tests. For instance, the fact that more mature industries exhibit less syndication
could be due to different features. It could be, as we argue, that the precision of the VCs evalua-
tion is larger in those industries. Alternatively, it could be that for some industries (e.g. services),
projects require smaller amounts of investment, and VCs do not face hard capital constraints.
Also, there could be some heterogeneity in mature industries, with some projects being more
innovative and difficult to evaluate. Another way to test our prediction is to measure whether
more drastic innovations at the firm level induce more syndication. To test this hypothesis, one
could identify the product market strategies of different start-ups, in the spirit of the analysis
of Hellmann and Puri (2000), to define groups of firms of different innovativeness. We expect
syndication to be more prevalent for the most innovative firms.
In addition, some of our results highlight the importance of the level of experience of VCs
for the observed value added, and the financial return of syndicates. The empirical result of
Brander et al. (2002) that standalone investments exhibit less variable returns illustrates well
the case where VCs are highly experienced. It would be useful to include the level of experience
of venture capitalists to create different groups of standalone investments. One should find that
the difference in variability between standalone and syndicated investments should be stronger
for more experienced VCs. In the same vein, the model predicts that standalone experienced
VCs will exert more effort that syndicated less experienced VCs. One could introduce the level
of experience of VCs when measuring value-added. Effort should increase with the level of
experience of VCs, and should increase for standalone investments. An interesting feature of
the model is that there can be overprovision of effort by experienced VCs. This implies that
the relationship between effort and financial returns is not monotonic, especially for high levels
of experience. Empirically, this means that if one wants to investigate the relationship between
effort and returns, one should take into account the level of experience of VCs, on top of the
syndication decision.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the efficiency of the selection process of venture capitalists. We
provide a rationale for the syndication of venture capital investments based on the trade-off
between the need to gather accurate information on the quality of an investment opportunity,
and the need to maintain monopoly profits. We consider a model in which two venture capitalists
can generate costless signals on a highly uncertain venture. Although gathering information can
be profit-enhancing, collecting the second appraisal creates potential competition for the initial
venture capitalist. Forming a syndicate is a coordination device that prevents profit-dissipating
competition from actually taking place. Such a contract is however costly for the initial venture
capitalist, since he must forgo part of the project's surplus. The higher the profits the initial
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venture capitalist can capture when being the sole investor, the more reluctant he is to syndicate.
Therefore the actual syndication decision will not induce efficient learning. This is the first cost
of syndication. We show that this cost increases with the level of experience of the initial venture
capitalist. We then relate the syndication decision to the post-investment involvement of venture
capitalists. Very experienced venture capitalists find it too costly to syndicate and do not gather
enough information. Relying on their own signal, they provide too much effort. Moderately
experienced VCs also find it too costly to syndicate, and do not gather enough information.
However, because of their unprecise evaluation, they do not exert enough effort.
A second cost of syndication arises when there is moral hazard on the ex post value-added
effort of the initial venture capitalist. Syndication forces the two venture capitalists to share
ownership of the firm, which weakens the incentives to exert effort. We establish that this cost
decreases with the experience of the initial venture capitalist. Therefore syndication can also be
costly for very inexperienced venture capitalists since it can alter their incentives. This results
in the underprovision of effort by young or inexperienced venture capitalists.
We derive results concerning the link between the level of experience of venture capitalists,
the decision to syndicate, and the intensity of their ex-post involvement.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
• To set the proof of proposition 1, we first need to characterize the optimal investment/effort de-
cision when VC1 calls for a second evaluation according to the signals and the levels of experience
of the two agents.
Start with the case where s1 = H.
Suppose first that s2 = H. With bayesian updating, we get:
qH,H =
α1α2q0
α1α2q0 + (1− α1)(1− α2)(1− q0) .
Using equation (1), it follows that:
NPV (e, qH,H) ≥ 0⇔ α2 ≥ (1− α1)(1− q0)(I − plR+ c)
α1q0((ph + ²)R− I − c) + (1− α1)(1− q0)(I − plR+ c) ≡ ϕI,e(α1).
And using equation (2):
NPV (6 e, qH,H) ≥ 0⇔ α2 ≥ (1− α1)(1− q0)(I − plR)
α1q0(phR− I) + (1− α1)(1− q0)(I − plR) ≡ ϕI, 6e(α1).
It follows that:
NPV (e, qH,H) ≥ NPV (6 e, qH,H) ⇔ α2 ≥ (1− α1)(1− q0)c
α1q0(²R− c) + (1− α1)(1− q0)c
≡ ϕe(α1)
One checks easily that under assumption 1, ϕe(α1) ≥ ϕI,e(α1) ≥ ϕI, 6e(α1) ∀α1. Therefore, when
both VCs receive good signals, it is optimal :
- to invest and exert effort when α2 > ϕe(α1),
- not to invest when α2 < ϕI, 6e(α1),
- to invest and not exert effort when α2 ∈ [ϕI, 6e(α1);ϕe(α1)].
Suppose next that s2 = L.
NPV (e, qH,L) ≥ 0⇔ α2 ≤ α1q0((ph + ²)R− I − c)
α1q0((ph + ²)R− I − c) + (1− α1)(1− q0)(I − plR+ c) ≡ ϕ6I,e(α1).
And :
NPV ( 6 e, qH,L) ≥ 0⇔ α2 ≤ α1q0(phR− I)
α1q0(phR− I) + (1− α1)(1− q0)(I − plR) ≡ ϕ 6I, 6e(α1).
It follows that:
NPV (e, qH,L) ≥ NPV (6 e, qH,L) ⇔ α2 ≤ α1q0(²R− c)
α1q0(²R− c) + (1− α1)(1− q0)c
≡ ϕ6e(α1)
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Under assumption 1, ϕ6e(α1) ≤ ϕ6I,e(α1) ≤ ϕ 6I, 6e(α1) ∀α1. Therefore:
- it is optimal to invest and exert effort if α2 < ϕ6e(α1),
- it is optimal not to invest if α2 > ϕ6I,6e(α1),
- it is optimal to invest but not to exert effort if α2 ∈ [ϕ6e(α1);ϕ6I, 6e(α1)].
Consider now the case s1 = L.
If s2 = L, it is clearly optimal not to invest.
Suppose next that s2 = H. Proceeding as before, we get:
NPV (e, qL,H) ≥ 0⇔ α2 ≥ α1(1− q0)(I − plR+ c)(1− α1)q0((ph + ²)R− I − c) + α1(1− q0)(I − plR+ c) ≡ νI,e(α1).
And:
NPV (6 e, qL,H) ≥ 0⇔ α2 ≥ α1(1− q0)(I − plR)(1− α1)q0(phR− I) + α1(1− q0)(I − plR) ≡ νI,6e(α1).
It follows that:
NPV (e, qL,H) ≥ NPV (6 e, qL,H) ⇔ α2 ≥ α1(1− q0)c(1− α1)q0(²R− c) + α1(1− q0)c
≡ νe(α1)
One checks easily that νe(α1) ≥ νI,e(α1) ≥ νI, 6e(α1) ∀α1. Also, νI, 6e(α1) is always larger than 12
since NPV (6 e, qL) ≤ 0. We conclude that:
- when α2 < νI, 6e(α1), it is optimal not to invest,
- when α2 ∈ [νI, 6e(α1); νe(α1)], investment takes place, but not effort is exerted,
- when α2 > νe(α1), it is optimal to invest and exert effort.
• The second part of the proof consists in determining when the investment decision is
reversed for at least one possible signal s2.
When s1 = L, VC1 does not invest alone. Hence information is valuable when VC2' s signal
makes the project's NPV positive. This arises when α2 > νI, 6e(α1).
Suppose now that s1 = H. Define αI the minimum level of VC1's experience, such that
investing but not exerting effort becomes valuable after a good signal. Using equation (2), such
a threshold is obtained by solving:
NPV (6 e, qH) ≥ 0⇔ α1 ≥ (1− q0)(I − plR)
q0(phR− I) + (1− q0)(I − plR) ≡ αI .
Define similarly αe the minimum level of experience above which it is valuable to start exerting
effort. This threshold solves:
NPV (e, qH) ≥ NPV (6 e, qH)⇔ α1 ≥ (1− q0)c
q0(²R− c) + (1− q0)c ≡ αe.
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See that:
αe ≥ αI ⇔ c(ph − pl) ≥ ²(I − plR).
As a consequence, under assumption 1, after receiving a good signal, it is optimal not to invest
when α1 < αI , to invest and not exert effort when α1 ∈ [αI ;αe], and to invest and exert effort
when α1 > αe.
It follows that :
- when α1 < αI , VC1 asks for a second evaluation if VC2's good signal makes the project's NPV
positive, i.e. when α2 > ϕI, 6e(α1).
- When α1 ∈ [αI ;αe], VC1 calls for VC2 if the latter is experienced enough to deter investment
when receiving a bad signal, or to induce effort. Since ϕe(α1) > ϕ6I, 6e(α1) for all α1 in the interval
considered, information gathering occurs when α2 > ϕ 6I, 6e(α1).
- When α1 > αe, information gathering occurs to deter effort after a bad signal s2, or to deter
investment, i.e. when α2 > min[ϕ 6e(α1);ϕ 6I, 6e(α1))].
Last, check that ∂ϕI, 6e(α1)∂α1 is negative so that the minimum level of VC2's experience needed
to trigger investment decreases with α1. At the opposite note that ∂ϕ 6I,6e(α1)∂α1 is positive, which
means that the minimum level of VC2's experience needed to deter investment increases with
α1. Similarly, ∂ϕe(α1)∂α1 ≤ 0 and
∂ϕ 6e(α1)
∂α1
≥ 0, so that the same result applies concerning the effort
decision.
¤
Generalization with a continuous investment model
We consider a continuous investment model to assess the robustness of our results. To give a
flavor of the generalization of our model, we present here the results of proposition 1, with a
general investment model, for the case of an initial good signal (i.e. s1 = H).
Consider the following continuous investment model.
For any investment level I ∈ R+, the project generates in case of success a revenue R(I).
The function R on R+ is such that: R′(I) > 0, and R′′(I) < 0. The FOC of the maximization
of the project's NPV when effort is not exerted gives:
R′(I) =
1
q(ph − pl) + pl . (4)
Denote I6e(q) the solution of equation (4). Since we have decreasing returns (R is concave), I 6e(q)
is an increasing function of the belief q. When investment occurs, the project's NPV can be
written:
−I 6e(q) + [q(ph − pl) + pl]R(I6e(q)).
28
Define q∗I,6e the belief such that the project's NPV, when effort is not exerted, is equal to zero.
The belief q∗I, 6e verifies:
−I6e(q∗I, 6e) + [q∗I, 6e(ph − pl) + pl]R(I6e(q∗I, 6e)) = 0.
Note that in the binary investment choice model, we are able to specify explicitly q∗I, 6e and
I6e(q), thus to solve analytically the model. Also, we can easily present the solutions graphically
in a two-dimension space. All this is not possible in the general continuous investment model.
This gives the following investment rule, where I∗6e is the optimal level of investment, given
that no effort is exerted:
{
I∗6e = 0 if q < q∗I, 6e
I∗6e = I6e(q) if q ≥ q∗I, 6e
Similarly, the FOC of the maximization of the NPV when effort is exerted is:
R′(I) =
1
q(ph + ²− pl) + pl . (5)
Denote Ie(q) the solution of equation (5) and define q∗I,e the belief such that the project's
NPV, when effort is exerted, is equal to zero. The belief q∗I,e verifies:
−c− Ie(q∗I,e) + [q∗I,e(ph + ²− pl) + pl]R(Ie(q∗I,e)) = 0.
The optimal level of investment, given that no effort is exerted, is defined by:{
I∗e = 0 if q < q∗I,e
I∗e = Ie(q) if q ≥ q∗I,e
We consider that effort is not very efficient, q∗I, 6e < q∗I,e, which is equivalent to the following
condition:
I∗6e
R(I∗6e )
− pl
ph − pl <
c+I∗e
R(I∗e )
− pl
ph + ²− pl (6)
In our binary investment model, the inequality (6) boils down to what is referred to as
assumption (1).
Define q∗e the minimum level of experience above which it is valuable to start exerting effort.
This threshold solves:
NPV (e, qH) ≥ NPV (6 e, qH)⇔ q∗e ≥
I∗e + c− I∗6e + pl(R(I∗6e )−R(I∗e ))
(ph + ²− pl)R(I∗e )− (ph − pl)R(I∗6e )
.
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Check that under condition (6), we have that q∗I, 6e < q∗e .
Initially, q0 < q∗I, 6e: the project is not profitable. Suppose first that VC1 has received a good
signal, but is not experienced enough to invest alone, i.e. qH < q∗I, 6e. He asks for a second
evaluation if the project's NPV becomes positive if VC2 receives a good signal, i.e. if:
NPV (6 e, qH,H) ≥ 0 ⇔ qH,H ≥ q∗6e
⇔ α2 ≥
q∗6e(1− α1)(1− q0)
α1q0(1− q∗6e) + q∗6e(1− α1)(1− q0)
≡ ϕR(I),6e(α1)
Assume now that investing but not exerting effort becomes valuable after a good signal, i.e.
q∗I, 6e < qH < q
∗
e . VC1 asks for a second evaluation if VC2 is experienced enough to induce effort
when receiving a good signal or to deter investment when receiving a bad signal i.e. if:
NPV (e, qH,H) ≥ NPV (6 e, qH,H) ⇔ qH,H ≥ q∗e
⇔ α2 ≥ (1− α1)(1− q0)q
∗
e
α1q0(1− q∗e)− (1− α1)(1− q0)q∗e
≡ ϕe(α1)
or
NPV (6 e, qH,L) ≤ 0 ⇔ qH,L ≤ q∗I, 6e
⇔ α2 ≥
α1q0(1− q∗6e)
α1q0(1− q∗6e) + q∗6e(1− α1)(1− q0)
≡ ϕ6R(I),6e(α1)
To state the results of proposition 1, check that functions ϕR(I),6e(α1), ϕe(α1) and ϕ6R(I),6e(α1)
have the same properties as in the binary investment model. See that:
∂ϕR(I),6e(α1)
∂α1
< 0.
This implies that the minimum level of VC2's experience needed to trigger investment decreases
with α1.
We have that
∂ϕe(α1)
∂α1
< 0,
so that the minimum level of VC2's experience needed to induce effort decreases with α1.
Also:
∂ϕ 6R(I),6e(α1)
∂α1
> 0.
The minimum level of VC2's experience needed to discourage investment increases with α1.
¤
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Proof of proposition 2
The proof of this proposition is straightforward. Recall from the proof of proposition 1 that if
s1 = L or if s1 = H and α1 < αI , the optimal decision is not to invest. Hence, VC1 decides to
syndicate iff:
0 < prob(s2 = H)
1
2
max {0;NPV (e, qs1,H);NPV (6 e, qs1,H)}
+prob(s2 = L)
1
2
max {0;NPV (e, qs1,L);NPV (6 e, qs1,L)} .
Simplifying both sides by 12 gives the same condition for syndication as in the first best.
¤
Proof of proposition 3
Suppose that s1 = H. The case where α1 < αI is treated in proposition 2.
• When α1 ∈ [αI , αe], it is optimal for VC1 to invest but not to exert effort when staying
alone. Therefore, VC1 syndicates iff:
NPV (6 e, qH) < prob(s2 = H)12NPV (6 e, qH,H) if α2 ∈ [ϕ6I,6e(α1), ϕe(α1)]
NPV (6 e, qH) < prob(s2 = H)12NPV (e, qH,H) if α2 > ϕe(α1) and α2 > ϕ6I,6e(α1)
NPV (6 e, qH) < prob(s2 = H)12NPV (e, qH,H)
+prob(s2 = L)12NPV ( 6 e, qH,L) if α2 ∈ [ϕe(α1), ϕ 6I, 6e(α1)]
This reduces to
α2 >
2α1q0(phR−I)+(1−α1)(1−q0)(plR−I)
α1q0(phR−I)−(1−α1)(1−q0)(plR−I) ≡ ϕs, 6I, 6e(α1) if α2 ∈ [ϕ6I, 6e(α1), ϕe(α1)]
α2 >
2α1q0(phR−I)+(1−α1)(1−q0)(plR−I+c)
α1q0[(ph+²)R−I−c]−(1−α1)(1−q)(plR−I−c) ≡ ϕs,6I,e(α1) if α2 > ϕe(α1) and α2 > ϕ6I, 6e(α1)
α2 >
α1q0(phR−I)+(1−α1)(1−q0)(plR−I+c)
α1q0(²R−c)+(1−α1)(1−q0)(c) ≡ ϕs,e(α1) if α2 ∈ [ϕe(α1), ϕ 6I, 6e(α1)]
The proof of proposition 1 states that information gathering is optimal for α2 ≥ ϕ6I,6e(α1),
when α1 ∈ [αI , αe]. It is easy to check that both ϕs,6I, 6e(α1) and ϕs,6I,e(α1) are greater than
ϕ6I,6e(α1) ∀α1. Also note that ϕs,e(α1) < 1 is not consistent with α1 ≥ αI . Therefore, when
α1 ∈ [αI , αe], potential competition makes VC1 more demanding in term of VC2's experience.
For consistency, we verify below whether the necessary conditions for syndication are com-
patible with the interval considered for α1 and α2. We have ϕs,6I, 6e(α1) ≤ 1 iff:
α1 ≤ 2(1− q0)(I − plR)
q0(phR− I) + 2(1− q0)(I − plR) < 1. (7)
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which is compatible with some α1 ∈ [αI , αe].
And ϕs, 6I,e(α1) ≤ 1 iff:
α1 ≤ 2(1− q0)(I − plR)
q0(phR− I)− q0(²R− c) + 2(1− q0)(I − plR) < 1. (8)
which is compatible with α1 ≥ αI .
• When α1 > αe, it is optimal for VC1 to invest and exert effort when staying alone. VC1
syndicates iff:{
NPV (e, qH) < prob(s2 = H)
1
2
NPV (e, qH,H) + prob(s2 = L)
1
2
NPV (6 e, qH,L) if α2 ∈ [ϕ6e(α1), ϕ 6I,6e(α1)]
NPV (e, qH) < prob(s2 = H)
1
2
NPV (e, qH,H) if α2 ≥ ϕ 6I, 6e(α1)
This equation simplifies to:{
α2 >
α1q0[(ph+²)R−I−c]+(1−α1)(1−q0)(plR−I−c)+α1q0(²R−c)
α1q0(²R−c)+(1−α1)(1−q0)c ≡ ϕs,I, 6e(α1) if α2 ∈ [ϕ6e(α1), ϕ 6I, 6e(α1)]
α2 >
2α1q0(phR−I)+(1−α1)(1−q0)(plR−I+c)
α1q0[(ph+²)R−I−c]−(1−α1)(1−q0)(plR−I−c)] ≡ ϕs,6I(α1) if α2 > ϕ 6I, 6e(α1)
Simple computations establish that:
- ϕs,I, 6e(α1) > ϕ6I,6e(α1): the first case considered does not exist,
- and ϕs, 6I(α1) < 1 is not compatible with α2 ≥ ϕ6I, 6e(α1).
This implies that when α1 ≥ αe, VC1 prefers not to syndicate.
¤
Proof of corollary 1
We know from proposition 2 that if VC1 receives a bad signal, or if he receives a good signal
but α1 < αI , he syndicates whenever it is optimal to do so. We thus focus on the case where
s1 = H and α1 ≥ αI . In that case, the second piece of information is used to deter investment,
or to modify the effort decision. Combining the results of propositions 1 and 3, we get:
- if α1 ∈ [αI ;αe], there is too much investment for α2 ∈ [ϕ6I,6e(α1);min[ϕs,6I, 6e(α1);ϕs,6I,e(α1)]],
- if α1 > αe, there is too much investment for α2 > ϕ6I, 6e.
¤
Proof of corollary 2
• Suppose that α1 ∈ [αI , αe]
When α2 ∈ [ϕe(α1);ϕs,6I,e(α1)] VC1 invests alone and does not exert effort while a second
good signal would encourage effort. There is thus underprovision of effort.
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• Suppose that α1 ≥ αe
Because of the cost of syndication, VC1 prefers not to syndicate, and exerts effort each time
he receives a good signal. The first best information gathering requires to ask for a second signal,
and stop exerting effort when a bad second signal if obtained, if α2 ∈ [ϕ 6e;ϕ 6I, 6e]. There is thus
overprovision of effort.
¤
A numerical example of the incidence of the unobservability of effort
Consider the following parameter values, which are consistent with assumption 1.
q0 = 0.4 pl = 0.3 ph = 0.7 R = 90 I = 50 ² = 0.1 c = 8
Unobservable effort does not modify the effort decision under syndication iff
c
qH,H²R
≤
(
1
2NPV (e, qH,H) + I + c
)
qH,H(ph + ²)R+ (1− qH,H)plR.
Assume equality and call α∗2(α1) the positive root of the above equation. Thus, the inequality
is true if α2 ≥ α∗2(α1).
The following figure plots the root α∗2(α1) on figure 2 which represents the syndication and
effort decision. The dashed region represents the cost of syndication due to unobservable effort.
In this zone, when effort is observable, VC1 syndicates and exerts effort when both signals are
good. When effort is not observable, VC1 syndicates but does not exert effort when both signals
are good: as stated in proposition 4, moral hazard leads to underprovision of effort when VC1 is
not very experienced.
Expected value of syndicated vs standalone projects: a numerical example
Consider the following parameter values:
q0 = 0.4 pl = 0.3 ph = 0.7 R = 90 I = 45 ² = 0.1 c = 8
Under these values, assumption 1 holds.
Suppose that there are two VCs in the economy, with experience α = 0.73585 and α = 0.65.
Note that: 0.73585 and 0.65 ∈ [αI , αe], 0.65 ≤ ϕ6I,6e(0.73585), but 0.73585 > ϕ6I, 6e(0.65). Also,
0.73585 < νI, 6e(0.65) and 0.65 ≤ νI, 6e(0.73585). These parameter values imply that:
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Figure 3: Unobservable effort and syndication decision when s1 = H.
- if the more experienced VC receives the project first, he prefers not to call for a second signal:
he invests alone, and does not exert effort, after a good signal,
- if the less experienced VC receives the project first, he calls for the second signal.
Therefore, we can compute the expected value of the project financed by the more experienced
VC, and compare it to the value of the project financed by the syndicate. We get:
NPV (e, qH , α1 = 0.73585) = 5.4
NPV (e, qH,H , α1 = 0.65, α2 = 0.73585) = 9.9083
For these parameter values, the standalone project has a lower expected return than the syndi-
cated project.34
With potential competition, the less experienced VC still prefers to syndicate: 0.73585 >
ϕs, 6I, 6e(0.65), and invests iff both have received a good signal. The more experienced VC prefers
to stay alone and invests only after a good signal.
34Note however that the more experienced VC earns higher expected profits than the syndicate because he
finances more projects (or to put it differently, he finances the project more often).
34
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